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CHALLENGING UNEQUAL PROPERTY TAX
ASSESSMENTS IN MINNESOTA
HON. EARL B. GUSTAFSONt
Payment of property taxes is a concern for individuals and corpora-
tions in today's economic climate. Few property owners are willing to
carry an unequal burden in the payment of their property taxes. In
his Article, Judge Gustafson sets out a step-by-step analysis for equal-
izing property tax burdens in the Minnesota Tax Court.
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INTRODUCTION
Individual taxpayers and taxpayer associations frequently
complain that they are shouldering more than their "fair
share" of Minnesota's property taxes. Much of this perceived
inequality results from a complex statutory scheme that applies
significantly different tax rates to different classes of property.'
t ChiefJudge of the Minnesota Tax Court. Judge Gustafson received his B.A.
from Gustavus Adolphus College in 1950 and his J.D. from the University of Minne-
sota Law School in 1954. He was the president of the law firm of Harper, Eaton,
Gustafson & Peterson in Duluth, Minnesota prior to his appointment to the Minne-
sota Tax Court in 1977. Judge Gustafson also served three terms in the Minnesota
House of Representatives and one term in the Minnesota Senate.
1. The Minnesota Tax Study Commission found that Minnesota has the oldest
and one of the most complex real property tax classification systems in the nation. It
clearly has the greatest number of classes. Depending upon whether various credits
1
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Assuming reasonable classification, however, this type of "dis-
crimination" is considered constitutionally permissible and any
remedy lies with the legislature, not with the courts. 2 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court has not ruled any statutory tax classifi-
cation unreasonable since 1939. 3
Another source of discrimination is the intentional or unin-
tentional practice of local assessors in valuing property at a
fraction of market value. No discrimination results from valu-
ing all real property at the same percentage of market value,
whatever that percentage might be. For example, if all prop-
erty were valued at either 50% of market value or at 110% of
market value, there would be no unequal treatment. A specific
dollar amount must be raised annually from property within
each taxing district to finance schools and local government.
For this reason, unequal assessments automatically and un-
fairly shift the tax burden within the district from property with
are considered, the number of classes have been estimated from between 20 and 70.
FINAL REPORT OF THE MINNESOTA TAX STUDY COMMISSION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS, 291 (Butterworth 1986). Rates applied to the assessor's estimated market
value to arrive at assessed value vary dramatically. Agricultural homesteads and
farmland are taxed at a 14% rate for the first $64,000 of estimated market value and
the remaining market value is valued and assessed at an 18% rate. MINN. STAT.
§ 273.13, subd. 6 (1986). Non-homestead residential property has a rate of 28% for
three units or less and 34% for four units or more. Id. § 273.13, subd. 19. Commer-
cial and industrial property is assessed at 28% of the first $60,000 of market value
and over $60,000 in estimated market value has a rate of 43%, id. § 273.23, subd. 24,
and unmined iron ore at a rate of 50%. Id. § 273.13, subd. 30.
2. The legislature is given wide latitude in making classifications for tax pur-
poses. Legislative determinations will not be disturbed unless the classification is
clearly arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to a governmental purpose. Lund
v. County of Hennepin, 403 N.W.2d 617, 619-20 (Minn. 1987); In re McCannel, 301
N.W.2d 910, 916-17 (Minn. 1980); Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353,
356-57 (Minn. 1979); Elwell v. County of Hennepin, 301 Minn. 63, 75-76, 221
N.W.2d 538, 546 (1974); In re Cold Spring Granite Co., 271 Minn. 460, 466, 136
N.W.2d 782, 787 (1965); State v. Donovan, 218 Minn. 606, 609, 16 N.W.2d 897, 898
(1944); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Commissioner, 216 Minn. 307, 309-10, 12
N.W.2d 625, 627 (1943).
In Hegenes v. State, 328 N.W.2d 719 (Minn. 1983), the supreme court, in af-
firming the tax court, found that taxing small non-homestead properties (three units
or less) at 32% of market value and larger properties (four units or more) at 40% of
market value under Minnesota Statutes section 273.13, subdivision 19 was based on
rational distinction between two types of properties and therefore did not violate
either the uniformity clause of the Minnesota Constitution or the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 721-22.
3. National Tea Co. v. State, 205 Minn. 443, 447-49, 286 N.W. 360, 362-64
(1939).
[Vol. 13
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a low fractional assessment to that with a higher fractional
assessment.
Minnesota has long required assessors to value all real prop-
erty at full market value not at some lower percentage of mar-
ket value. 4 The current statute provides that "all property
shall be valued at its market value .... [T]he assessor shall not
adopt a lower or different standard of value because the same
is to serve as a basis of taxation.. . ."5 In the past, many asses-
sors did not follow the law and, instead, yielding to political
pressure, valued individual parcels and, more often, entire
classes of property at a fraction of market value. For example,
in rural counties, agricultural land would traditionally be un-
dervalued and, in urban areas, homesteads might be
undervalued.
In 1964, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Dulton Realty, Inc.
v. State,6 made the following observation:
From the foregoing it can be ascertained that the solution
to the problem before us is difficult, not only because our
statutory scheme of assessment is antiquated and inade-
quate, but also because its basic requirements have to a
great extent been ignored. Instead of using the market or
true and full value of property to be assessed as the basis for
its taxation, as the statutes require, each assessor has estab-
lished a formula under which only a percentage of such
value is used for assessment purposes. These percentages
vary greatly from one taxing district to another even within
counties.
7
The law pertaining to this latter type of inequality or unequal
treatment by assessors and the development of court-fash-
ioned remedies to overcome this discrimination is the general
subject of this Article.
Since the late 1970's, there has been a significant increase in
the volume of property tax appeals raising the issue of unequal
treatment. This coincided with the change in the part-time tax
court to a full-time court in 1977, and the expansion of its ju-
risdiction to include property tax appeals.8 Since 1980, two
4. 1878 Minn. Gen. Laws, ch. 11, § 28, at 219; see also State v. Thayer, 69 Minn.
170, 175, 71 N.W. 931, 933 (1897).
5. MINN. STAT. § 273.11, subd. 1 (1986).
6. 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964).
7. Id. at 20, 132 N.W.2d at 407-08.
8. Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 307, §§ 1-32, 1977 Minn. Laws 606, 606-19 (codi-
fied as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 271.01-.22 (1986)). Although district courts have
1987]
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factors have undoubtedly given rise to the increase in the vol-
ume of unequal treatment or discrimination cases. These were
the elimination of the requirement that intentional undervalu-
ation of other property must be proven 9 and the availabilty of
government financed assessment/sales ratio studies as evi-
dence' 0 in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination."
This, in turn, has created a substantial body of new case law
generated, first, by the tax court and, on appeal, by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court. This Article will discuss the constitu-
tional basis of a "discrimination" claim, past and recent
developments in this area of the law, and the proof required
when claiming unequal assessment.
To present a claim of discrimination or unequal treatment,
the taxpayer must first file a petition in either district court or
tax court under Chapter 278 of the Minnesota Statutes. When
this petition comes on for hearing, the petitioner/owner must
be prepared to prove the market value of the subject property
on the assessment date in question. Only after the market
value has been determined is the court in a position to make a
finding that an individual parcel has suffered unequal treat-
ment when a comparison is made to the level of assessment
(percentage of market value) at which other properties in the
taxing district are valued. This general "level of assessment"
can only be proven through assessment/sales ratio studies. If
the taxpayer's property is valued by the assessor at approxi-
mately the same percentage of market value as most other
properties in the taxing district, there is no discrimination. On
the other hand, if most other property is valued at a substan-
dual jurisdition with the tax court in property tax appeals brought under Chapter
278, Minnesota Statutes, most cases are automatically transferred to tax court. This
can and is done without first obtaining the approval of the parties. The Hennepin
County District Court voted to transfer its entire backlog of property tax appeals to
the new tax court shortly after it was established. See Minutes of the Special Meeting
of the Judges of District Court, Hennepin County, Minnesota (August 11, 1977).
Most other counties have done likewise. Brent Peterson, Clerk of Tax Court, esti-
mates that 98% of Chapter 278 property tax petitions are now heard in tax court.
9. United Nat'l Corp. v. County of Hennepin, 299 N.W.2d 73, 76 (Minn. 1980).
10. MINN. STAT. § 278.05, subd. 4 (1982).
11. In re Objection to Real Property Taxes, 353 N.W.2d 525, 530-31 (Minn.
1984) (a consolidated appeal from two Minnesota Tax Court decisions, Short v.
County of Hennepin, Nos. 0110, 0455, 0869, 1088 (Minn. Tax Ct. Aug. 1982) and
3030 Drew Co. v. State of Minn. and County of Hennepin, Nos. 0145, 0324, 0604,
1134, 1560 (Minn. Tax Ct. 1982).
[Vol. 13
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss3/2
PROPERTY TAX
tially lower percentage of market value, then the valuation of
the subject property, for tax purposes, should be reduced.
This Article will not examine the proof required in "market
value" cases where the sole claim presented is that the assessor
has valued the property in excess of its market value. Pure val-
uation cases usually turn on the testimony of the expert ap-
praisal witnesses called by each party. No consideration is
given to the level of assessment of other properties in the tax-
ing district. A market value issue maybe raised and litigated-
and often is-without advancing a claim of discrimination.
The reverse, however, is not true. To prevail in a "discrimina-
tion" case, the court must first have sufficient evidence to es-
tablish the market value of the subject property before it can
determine whether it should be equalized with other property
in the taxing district. 12 Both a valuation issue and an unequal
assessment issue may be raised in the same case. An allegation
in the petition that the property has been "unfairly and un-
equally assessed" is sufficient to raise both issues.' 3
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF CLAIM
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and the uniformity clause of
the Minnesota Constitution 14 have both been invoked by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in striking down unequal property
tax assessments. 15 Claims of discriminatory action by a state or
its agencies in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment are usu-
ally brought in federal court. Two factors militate against
seeking this relief in the area of property taxes. First, there is a
higher degree of proof required in federal court, namely estab-
12. Renneke v. County of Brown, 255 Minn. 244, 248, 97 N.W.2d 377, 380
(1959).
13. A new property tax petition must be filed each year with the Clerk of District
Court in the county in which the property is situated no later than May 15th of the
year in which taxes are due and payable. Service of notice and filing requirements
are strictly followed. Both first and second half taxes must also be paid when due or
the court loses jurisdiction and the petition is automatically dismissed. Land O'Lakes
v. County of Douglas, 225 Minn. 535, 538, 31 N.W.2d 474, 476 (1948); MINN. STAT.
§ 278.03 (1986). Reinstatement is permitted in limited circumstances where failure
to pay taxes on time cannot be attributable to petitioner. Thunderbird Motel Corp.
v. County of Hennepin, 289 Minn. 239, 240-41, 183 N.W.2d 569, 570 (1977).
14. MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1.
15. Elwell, 301 Minn. at 75-76, 221 N.W.2d at 546; Cold Spring Granite Co., 271
Minn. at 466, 136 N.W.2d at 787; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 273.11 and 278.01 (requir-
ing all property to be fairly and equally valued for tax purposes at its market value).
1987]
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lishing that the assessor intentionally made unequal assess-
ments, 16 and second, there is a statutory requirement that all
reasonable state remedies be exhausted before relief in federal
court is sought.' 7 Prior to Hamm v. State,'8 the Minnesota
Supreme Court appeared reluctant to grant judicial relief from
"unconstitutional" property tax assessments.19
The United States Supreme Court, as early as 1918, con-
strued the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution as a bar to intentional and arbitrary over-assessment
of one property to the detriment of its owner while other prop-
erty in the taxing district was systematically being assessed at a
much lower percentage of market value.20 In Sunday Lake Iron
v. Township of Wakefield, 2' the United States Supreme Court
said:
The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is to secure every person within the
State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrim-
ination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or
by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.
And it must be regarded as settled that intentional system-
atic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable prop-
erty in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of
one taxed upon the full value of his property. 22
The Minnesota Supreme Court had earlier held that a tax-
payer had no standing to present a claim of unequal treatment
if his property was not assessed in excess of market value. 23
Because few, if any, properties were valued at full market
value, this precluded virtually all taxpayers from presenting a
claim that their property was overvalued as compared to other
property. In 1959, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed it-
self and held that taxpayers have a constitutional right to have
their property assessment reduced to the same lower level as
16. E.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944); Southland Mall, Inc. v. Gar-
ner, 455 F.2d 887, 889 (6th Cir. 1972).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1987 supp).
18. 255 Minn. 64, 95 N.W.2d 649 (1959).
19. See State v. Fritch, 175 Minn. 478, 221 N.W. 175 (1928); State v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 103 Minn. 419, 115 N.W. 1039 (1908); State v. Lakeside Land Co., 71
Minn. 283, 73 N.W. 970 (1898).
20. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352-53
(1918); see also Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
21. 247 U.S. 350, 358 (1918).
22. Id. at 352-53.
23. See Cudahy Packing Co., 103 Minn. at 421, 115 N.W. at 646.
[Vol. 13
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others even though their property might already be assessed at
less than market value.
2 4
II. HAMM V. STATE AND ITS PROGENY
In the landmark decision of Hamm v. State,25 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held:
In the Cudahy case, decided 50 years ago, this court refused
to grant relief to a taxpayer whose property was assessed at
its approximate market value even though other property of
the same class was assessed at far less than market value.
The Cudahy case is clearly wrong in giving validity to a prin-
ciple which denies relief to a taxpayer who is saddled with a
substantially disproportionate share of the tax burden as a
result of inequality in assessment ....
The right to uniformity and equality is the right to equal
treatment in the apportionment of the tax burden. Uniform-
ity of taxation does not permit the systematic, arbitrary, or intentional
valuation of the property of one or afew taxpayers at a substantially
higher valuation than that placed on other property of the same
class.
26
After Hamm, a taxpayer could obtain a reduction in the as-
sessor's valuation if it was shown that the property was (1) sys-
tematically, arbitrarily or intentionally (2) valued substantially
higher than (3) other property of the same class (4) in the same
taxing district.27
A. Requirement of Intent Eliminated
The rule remains essentialy the same today with one excep-
tion. The need to prove intentional undervaluation of other
property vis-a-vis the taxpayer's property was removed by
United National Corp. v. County of Hennepin.28 This was a change
from the federal rule which continues to require proof of in-
tentional overvaluation when compared to other property.
The other three elements of the rule, namely, (1) substantial
inequality with property of the (2) same class in the (3) same
taxing district, have not changed but all have been clarified or
24. See Hamm, 255 Minn. at 70, 95 N.W.2d at 654-55.
25. 255 Minn. 64, 95 N.W.2d 649.
26. Id. at 68-70, 95 N.W.2d at 653-54 (emphasis added).
27. See id.
28. 299 N.W.2d 73 (Minn. 1980).
1987]
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expanded within the past seven years.2 9
B. Taxing District Expanded to Counties
What constitutes the same "taxing districts" has been ex-
panded by statute. 30 Minnesota case law, after the Hamm deci-
sion, interpreted the "same taxing district" to be the city or
township where the property was located.3 t This was changed
by the 1980 legislature.32 Comparisons may now be made with
property throughout the same county. 3"
C. Property of Same Class Expanded to All Classes
What constitutes "other property of the same class" has also
been expanded, or at least, clarified by case law.34 Typicially,
in the metropolitan area, the taxpayer offers evidence of un-
dervaluation of other property within the same tax classifica-
tion as the subject property. Commercial property is
compared with other commercial property and homestead
property is compared with other homesteads. In rural areas of
the state, where there often are insufficient sales in one class to
make a valid analysis of the level of assessment, the trial judge
has considered evidence of the level of assessment of all
classes of property. 35
After Hamm, the next major discrimination case was In re
Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State,36 in which the court ordered equali-
zation between classes of property at the lowest level in the
29. See, e.g., Note, Grounds and Procedures for Attacking Real Property Tax Assessments in
Minnesota, 4 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 371 (1978) (review and analysis of attacks on
property tax assessments prior to 1978).
30. Act of Apr. 3, 1980, ch. 443, § 2, 1980 Minn. Laws 270, 270-71 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 278.01, subd. 1 (1986)).
31. Bethke v. County of Brown, 301 Minn. 380, 384-85, 223 N.W.2d 757, 760
(1974);Johnson v. County of Ramsey, 290 Minn. 307, 311, 187 N.W.2d 675, 678-79
(1971); Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 17, 132 N.W.2d 394, 405-06 (1964).
32. Act of Apr. 3, 1980, ch. 443, § 2, 1980 Minn. Laws 270, 270-71 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 278.01, subd. 1 (1986)).
33. Id.; see also Objection to Real Property Taxes, 353 N.W.2d at 529-30.
34. See Objection to Real Property Taxes, 353 N.W.2d at 530; see also Gamble Dev. Co.
v. County of St. Louis, No. 135535 (Minn. Tax Ct. July, 1981); George v. Mille Lacs
County, No. 11666 (Minn Tax Ct. Nov., 1980); Pillsbury Co. v. Commissioner, No.
2578 (Minn. Tax Ct. Jan., 1980).
35. Gamble Dev. Co., No. 135535 (Minn. Tax Ct. July, 1981); George, No. 11666
(Minn. Tax Ct. Nov., 1980); Pillsbury Co., No. 2578 (Minn. Tax Ct. Jan., 1980).
36. 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964).
[Vol. 13
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taxing district.3 7 The Duluth City Assessor, without statutory
authority, had deliberately been valuing different classes of
property at varying percentages of market value. 38 Home-
steads were allegedly valued at 30% while commercial prop-
erty was allegedly valued at 40%. 9 The trial court found that
certain parcels of downtown commercial property owned by
petitioners were, in reality, being singled out and valued be-
tween 68.75% and 90.38% of market value. 40 Meanwhile,
property outside of Duluth in St. Louis County was being
equalized at 20% of market value by the county assessor. 4' Us-
ing the county as a taxing district, the trial court ordered the
downtown Duluth parcels under petition to be reduced in
value to the non-Duluth county-wide assessment level. 42 The
supreme court held this county-wide equalization was too
broad and too deep and that any equalization should be made
within the City of Duluth as the taxing district.43 The court
did, however, order a reduction to the lowest level of assess-
ment in Duluth, namely, the 30% level of assessment at which
homesteads were valued.44 The remedy of reduction to the
lowest level was changed in 1980 by McCannel v. County of Henne-
pin45 to the average level of assessment.
The supreme court has recently approved this extension
from comparisons within the same class to comparisons includ-
ing all classes. In 3030 Drew Co. ,46 the court approved the use
of ratio studies and a weighted average designed by the trial
court to compare all classes of property in Hennepin County in
arriving at an average level of assessment for equalization pur-
poses.47 In the companion case,48 the court also approved the
usual method of using ratio studies within the same class.49
37. Id. at 21, 132 N.W.2d at 408.
38. Id. at 8, 132 N.W.2d at 399.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 5, 132 N.W.2d at 298.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 15, 132 N.W.2d at 402.
43. Id. at 17-20, 132 N.W.2d at 406-07.
44. Id. at 21, 132 N.W.2d at 408.
45. 301 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1980).
46. 3030 Drew Co., No. 2361 (Minn. Tax Ct. Aug., 1982), aff'd sub nom. In re Ob-
jection to Real Property Taxes, 353 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1984).
47. Objection to Real Property Taxes, 353 N.W.2d at 533.
48. Short, Nos. 0110, 0455, 0869, 1088 (Minn. Tax Ct. Mar., 1982), aff'd sub nom.
In re Objection to Real Property Taxes, 353 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1984).
49. In re McCannel remains good authority for the use of a sales ratio derived
1987]
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In the vast majority of cases, the tax court continues to make
comparisons only within the same class. This undoubtedly is
because the rule in the leading case, Hamm, refers only to
equality within the same class and, therefore, is the comparison
requested by most petitioners. Since the decisions in Short and
3030 Drew, the court clearly has discretionary power to make
comparisons within and between all classes of property in a
given taxing district whenever it deems it necessary to provide
equal protection. 50
D. "Substantial" Undervaluation or Inequality and
the Ninety Percent Rule
The rule in Hamm requires a showing of substantial underval-
uation of other property before relief will be granted to a com-
plaining taxpayer. 5' Specifically, the Hamm Court held that,
"[u]niformity and equality in a constitutional sense does not
require mathematical exactitude in the valuation of property
for taxation. Absolute equality is impracticable of attainment
and the taxpayer may not complain unless the inequality is
substantial."52
The issue then becomes what constitutes "substantial under-
valuation." The Minnesota Tax Court has developed a rule
that substantial undervaluation or inequality only exists where
other property of the same class as the subject property in the
same taxing district is found to be assessed at an average of
less than 90% of market value.53 In Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
from a comparison of properties in the same class in determining unequal assessment
in certain factual situations. 301 N.W.2d at 922. This was the measure of relief re-
quested in Short.
50. Id.
51. Hamm, 255 Minn. at 70, 95 N.W.2d at 655.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Fairmount Greens v. County of Hennepin, No. 2361 (Minn. Tax Ct. Dec.,
1985), summarily aff'd, No. CI-86-201 (Minn. May, 1986) (issued without opinion pur-
suant to MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. l(b)); see also MINN. STAT. § 278.01,
subd. 2. That section contains language authorizing the filing of a petition on home-
stead property if it is claimed that:
[S]aid parcel has been assessed at a valuation which exceeds by ten percent
or more the valuation which the parcel would have if it were valued at the
average assessment/sales ratio for real property in the same class, in that
portion of the county in which that parcel is located, for which the commis-
sioner is able to establish and publish a sales ratio study....
Id.
This provision is somewhat redundant because it merely codifies the current tax
(Vol. 13
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neapolis v. State,5 4 the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
tax court's finding that assessment levels of 85 to 90% in Min-
neapolis did not constitute substantial undervaluation. 55 In
Fairmount Greens v. County of Hennepin,56 the tax court found that
an assessment level of 93%6 for apartment building property in
Minneapolis did not constitute "substantial" inequality com-
pelling a reduction from a value stipulated by the parties. 57
This decision was summarily affirmed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court.58
III. PROVING CLAIM OF UNEQUAL ASSESSMENT
A. Procedure in Tax Court
The procedure in tax court does not differ from that in dis-
trict court. A property tax petition challenging the taxes must
be filed for each assessment year pursuant to Minnesota Stat-
utes section 278.01. There are no other pleadings. The peti-
tion is first served on the county auditor, the county treasurer,
and the county attorney.5 9 The petition is then filed, with
proof of service, with the district court administrator before
the sixteenth day of May of the year in which the tax becomes
payable.60 The district court administrator in each county acts
court practice. It does, however, indicate an indirect approval by the legislature of
the 90% rule employed by the tax court in all cases, not merely homestead cases.
Another provision relating to all classes of property and apparently limiting any
reduction in discrimination cases to a level of 10% below the average sales ratio was
passed in 1984. See Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 502, art. 11, § 5, 1984 Minn. Laws 493,
605-06 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 278.05, subd. 4 (1984)). This language in subdivi-
sion 4(d) has not been interpreted by any court and was repealed in 1986. See Act of
Apr. 1, 1986, ch. 473, § 6, 1986 Minn. Laws 1080, 1083.
Interestingly, the New Jersey Tax Court applies a 15% rule mandated by statute.
NJ.S.A. 54:51A (West 1986). No relief for equalization is allowed unless the ratio of
the assessor's value to market value exceeds the upper limit of the "common level
range." The "common level range" is defined by statute as that range which is plus
or minus 15% of the average ratio for a given taxing district. Id. § 54:1-35a. If the
subject property's assessment to market value ratio falls below the lower limit of this
"common level range" the court must raise the assessor's valuation.
54. 313 N.W.2d 619 (Minn. 1981).
55. Id. at 624. Federal Reserve Bank v. , Nos. 1633, 2321 (Minn. Tax
Ct. __, 19-_).
56. Nos. 3207, 4104 (Minn. Tax Ct. Dec., 1985).
57. Id.
58. See No. CI-86-201 (Minn. May 25, 1986) (issued without opinion pursuant to
MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1 (b)).
59. MINN. STAT. § 287.01, subd. 1 (1986).
60. Id.
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as clerk of tax court so the petition and other court documents
are not filed with the Tax Court Administrator in St. Paul, Min-
nesota. 61 A tax court judge will be sent to hear the case in the
county where the property is located.62 Again, pre-trial discov-
ery, trial procedure and the rules of evidence are the same as
district court.63 Both the tax court and the district court are
directed by the statute to hear tax petitions without delay and
at trial to "disregard technicalities and matters of form not af-
fecting the merits." 64
Prior to the filing of a petition, it is advisable to confer with
the local assessor informally to determine if settlement is pos-
sible. The local boards of equalization meet in the spring of
the assessment year-the year before the taxes are payable 65-
and a taxpayer may find it beneficial to appear before these
boards before coming to the tax court, but this is not required.
In proving a claim of unequal assessment, the taxpayer
should first establish the market value of the subject prop-
erty. 66 Once the value of the subject property is established,
proof should be offered to determine the general level of as-
sessment in the taxing district.67 This is done through assess-
ment/sales ratio studies.68 If other property in the taxing
district has consistently been valued at substantially below
market value, the taxpayer is entitled to have the property re-
duced in value. 69 The reduction is to the average assessment
level, not the lowest percentage of assessment of other
property.
70
For example, if the market value of a parcel of commercial
property is $1,000,000 and the assessor has it valued at
$900,000-90% of the market value-and it can be shown that
the average level of valuation of commercial property in the
same city or county is at 70% of market value, the property
should be reduced in value to that 70% level, or $700,000.
61. Id. § 271.02.
62. Id. § 271.04.
63. Id. § 271.06, subd. 7.
64. Id. § 278.05, subd. 1.
65. Id. § 274.01, subd. l(a).
66. See Renneke, 255 Minn. at 248, 97 N.W.2d at 380.
67. Id.
68. See generally MINN. STAT. § 278.05, subd. 4 (discussing the admissibilty of sales
ratio studies).
69. See McCannel, 301 N.W.2d at 921-22.
70. Id.
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B. Use of Assessment/Sales Ratio Studies
The level of assessment in a taxing district can be proven
through assessment/sales ratio studies which compare the ad-
justed sale prices of recent sales with the assessor's estimated
market values (EMVs) of these same properties. Showing that
two or three other properties in the municipality are underval-
ued is insufficient. 7 1 Both private and public assessment/sales
ratio studies can be used. Private studies, however, have not,
as yet, passed judicial muster in the Minnesota Supreme
Court.72 Many assessors prepare their own studies which can
be subpoenaed and used by taxpayers. Assessment/sales ratio
studies prepared by the Department of Revenue for purposes
of computing and distributing educational aids, once barred
from use as evidence, may now be introduced into evidence
without calling a state official to provide foundation. 73 There
also is an assessment/sales ratio study that has been specially
constructed by the Department of Revenue for the Minnesota
Tax Court. If there were no statutes either barring or author-
izing the use of state studies, they undoubtedly would be ad-
missible as a public record, report, or data compilation.7 4
A 1984 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 278.05,
subdivision 4 precludes the use of the Department of Reve-
nue's assessment/sales ratio studies unless "(a) the sales prices
are adjusted for terms of sale to reflect market value, (b) the
sales prices are adjusted to reflect the difference in the date of
sale compared to the assessment date, and (c) there is an ade-
quate sample size . . . . "75 This amendment was held to only
apply prospectively to causes of action that arise after the De-
partment of Revenue has the data available that will allow it to
make adjustments for financing terms and time of sale. 76 The
Department of Revenue is now making these adjustments in its
71. See Ploetz v. County of Hennepin, 301 Minn. 410, 414, 223 N.W.2d 761, 764
(1974).
72. United Nat7 Corp., 299 N.W.2d at 770.
73. MINN. STAT. § 278.05, subd. 4 (1986).
74. See, e.g., MINN. R. EVID. 803(8) (stating records, reports or data compilations
are not excluded by the hearsay rule); and id. 901(7) (stating that the requirement of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibilty is waived if
record, report or compilation is from the public office where such items are normally
kept).
75. Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 502, art. 11, § 5, 1984 Minn. Laws 493, 605.
76. See Bethune Assoc. v. County of Hennepin, 362 N.W.2d 323, 325 (Minn.
1985).
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assessment/sales ratio studies. There appears, therefore, to be
no bar to their admissibility and use.
The fact that an assessment/sales ratio study is admitted into
evidence does not mean that its conclusions are binding or will
be adopted by the tax court.77 Evidence of reliability or unreli-
ability may be offered and scrutinized by either party.78 A rep-
resentative sample of sales that is statistically reliable will
satisfy the court. 79 Assessment/sales ratio studies published
by the Department of Revenue are sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of unequal assessment.80
Through a legislative change in 1980, the assessor's records
including field cards and property appraisal cards are available
to taxpayers through pre-trial discovery and for use as evi-
dence at trial.8 ' This amendment also made evidence of com-
parable sales including the sales prices admissible, 2 thus
overruling State v. Winiecki,83 which held evidence of compara-
ble sales was inadmissible.
C. Reduction in Value not Automatic with Low Ratio
As indicated above, the court must first make a finding of
market value for the subject property before any ratio can be
applied equalizing this value with other property.8 4 This mar-
ket value finding is where danger lurks for the petitioning tax-
payer who comes to court confidently armed with a low
assessment/sales ratio study indicating that other property of
the same class in the same taxing district is assessed at, for ex-
ample, 75% of market value. A reduction in value to this sub-
stantially lower level is not automatic. The court may, based
on all the evidence adduced at trial, find that the market value
exceeds the assessor's estimated market value being chal-
lenged. This court-determined value is the one to which the
ratio is applied. Frequently, the assessor or his appraisal wit-
77. MINN. STAT. § 278.05, subd. 4 (1986).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Objection to Real Property Taxes, 353 N.W.2d at 531.
81. See Act of Apr. 3, 1980, ch. 443, § 3, 1980 Minn. Laws 270, 271 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 278.05, subd. 3 (1986)).
82. Id.
83. 263 Minn. 86, 91, 115 N.W.2d 724, 727 (1962).
84. See Renneke, 255 Minn. at 248, 97 N.W.2d at 380.
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nesses testify at trial to a higher value than the official EMV on
the tax rolls.
For example, if the assessor's EMV is $1,000,000 and he tes-
tifies at trial that, after a review appraisal, he is of the opinion
that the property actually had a market value of $1,500,000 on
the assessment date, the court, hypothetically, after weighing
all the evidence, might find the market value to be $1,400,000.
If the court further found, based upon assessment/sales ratio
studies, that the average level of assessment is at 75% of mar-
ket value, the property's value after equalization would be set
at $1,040,000 or a $40,000 increase in value over the EMV. 85
CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Constitution, article 10, section 1, provides
that, "jt]axes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects
S. ." and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees that no state shall "deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In
1959, the Hamm decision struck down the rule of State v. Cudahy
Packing Co.8 6 that a person whose property was valued at less
than 100% of market value had no standing to present a claim
of discrimination. 7 Nevertheless, the average Minnesota tax-
payer had not been able to effectively challenge unequal prop-
erty assessments until the time when the Department of
Revenue's assessment/sales ratio studies became available for
use as evidence to prove a claim of unequal treatment.8 8
"Unequal assessment" or "discrimination" claims can be
raised in any tax petition case. 9 The taxpayer first must prove
the market value then-usually through assessment/sales ratio
studies-prove that the property is unequally assessed by be-
ing singled out and valued at a substantially higher level than
most other properties in the city or county.
If the taxpayer's property is valued at approximately the
same percentage of market value as most other properties in
85. Since 1986, the tax court and district courts have the power to increase val-
ues. Act of Apr. 1, 1986, ch. 473, § 5, 1986 Minn. Laws 1080, 1081-82 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 287.05, subd. 1 (1986)).
86. 103 Minn. 419, 115 N.W. 645 (1908).
87. Hamm, 255 Minn. at 68-70, 95 N.W.2d at 653-54.
88. Cudahy Packing Co., 103 Minn. at 421-23, 115 N.W. at 646-47.
89. See MINN. STAT. § 278.05, subd. 4; see also Objection to Real Property Taxes, 353
N.W.2d at 525.
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the taxing district, there obviously is no unequal treatment and
no claim upon which relief will be granted. If most other prop-
erty is valued at a substantially lower level--over 10% lower-
than the taxpayer's property, then the subject property will be
reduced in value accordingly.
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